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Rethinking Repression
Where Do We Go from Here?
Lee A .  Smithey a nd Lester R.  Kurtz
Drawing together the expertise of a global collection of social sci-
entists and activists, we have interrogated a central dynamic of non-
violent civil resistance, the paradox of repression. Why and under 
what circumstances does repression against activists using nonviolent 
methods and tactics backfire, undermining the legitimacy of authori-
ties and mobilizing greater participation in civil resistance? We also 
focus on the practical application of knowledge about repression and 
backfire by nonviolent activists. How can the paradox of repression be 
cultivated? How can activists prepare for, manage, and blunt the nega-
tive impact of repression?
Some readers may chafe at the lack of a unifying definition or 
theory of repression. We chose not to spend a great deal of energy on 
coming to a consensus among all of the volume’s contributors about 
the parameters of “repression” (as opposed to oppression, suppression, 
etc.) so as to avoid cutting ourselves off from exploring fertile ground 
and important discoveries.
Some of our contributors define the paradox of repression as any 
unanticipated consequences of repression that authorities do not desire. 
Others complicate the concept of repression by delineating a range of 
repression types. We suggest in the introduction, further developed in 
chapter 8, that we consider repression along a continuum from overt 
violence, on one end, to hegemony (in which individuals self-censor) 
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on the other (see Figure 12.1). In a series of quantitative and theoreti-
cal overviews, as well as case studies from around the world, we have 
brought together insights from scholars and experienced activists to 
explore this crucial topic.
Issues and Themes
We believe that our approach has helped to generate exciting new 
insights and identified several important subdomains and avenues for 
further research. In this volume, we have explored a wide range of 
themes and issues around the paradox of repression, notably:
• the relational conception of power,
• agents of repression and the possibility of defections,
• strategic preparation for repression and overcoming fear,
• whether activists should deliberately provoke repression,
• the importance of mobilization,
• the role of external actors,
• cultural aspects of repression and its management,
• expanding frameworks for understanding repression,
• social psychological dimensions, and
• the role of the media and the issue of framing.
The Relational Conception of Power
In this volume, we focus on conflicts that are perceived as asymmetri-
cal while at the same time suggesting that they are more symmetrical 
than they seem. The paradox of repression makes more sense when 
we understand that power is a relational social construct that emerges 
from negotiated interactions between people with different statuses, 
knowledge, and resources in a society. We discuss this at some length 
12.1. A Continuum of Demobilization (Source: Lee A. Smithey and Lester 
R. Kurtz)
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in the introductory chapter, starting with Simmel and Gandhi, and 
the feminist distinction between empowerment (power to) and domi-
nation (power over). In his seminal work on conflict, German sociolo-
gist Georg Simmel (1971) stresses the importance of understanding 
conflict as relational and interactional, an aspect of a struggle that is 
crucial to understanding the dynamics of repression and its backfire. 
Each party to a conflict is engaged in a meaningful exchange, accord-
ing to Simmel, in which each responds to the actions and statements 
of the other, suggesting that power disparities are often not as severe 
as we might think.
Gandhi insisted, for example, that the British did not take India, 
but that the Indians gave it to them—after all, one hundred thou-
sand soldiers could not control 350 million Indians unless the Indians 
cooperated with them. The apparent asymmetries of power can be 
profoundly affected when authority is abused or resisted. Moreover, as 
Arendt (1969, 1970) notes, violence does not create power; instead, it is 
used by people who lack power or feel it slipping away.
Furthermore, opponents in conflict are working to influence one 
another through planned or strategic moves, either persuading, coerc-
ing, or bargaining (Kriesberg 1982). Situations involving strategic 
nonviolent action are no exception. Understanding the most effective 
means of waging nonviolent resistance has been the subject of decades 
of research and is reflected in many of the chapters in this volume. 
However, if we are to truly understand nonviolent resistance as part of 
conflict, we must also understand it as an interaction of activists with 
authorities and even agents of repression.
Agents of Repression and Defectors
The decision-making processes among regime functionaries is cru-
cial. Erica Chenoweth (chapter 2) shows that defections among secu-
rity forces and elites are a crucial factor determining the outcome of 
nonviolent resistance campaigns, along with the level of movement 
participation (the most crucial factor) and withdrawal of support by 
foreign allies. In a backfire situation, when state repression increases, 
so does domestic condemnation of the regime; defections are more 
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likely, however, with more media coverage. Moreover, it is possible 
that extremely intense repression can have a negative indirect effect 
on campaign success by reducing the size of subsequent campaigns.
The growing emphasis on defections means that we need further 
research on nonviolent struggle from the perspective of regimes and 
their agents, so we have incorporated that key aspect of repression 
in this book, even as it admittedly poses methodological challenges 
because of problems with access. We seem to know much more about 
the strategic efforts of social movement organizations than those of 
corporations, states, and other large institutions and their functionar-
ies, although there are clues to the authorities’ point of view and some-
times, as with Eric Nelson’s (2013) “Subversion of Social Movements 
by Adversarial Agents,” some responses to movement challengers are 
discussed openly in the strategic literature.
In chapter 4, Rachel MacNair explores the psychological costs to 
agents of repression in terms of what she calls perpetration-induced 
traumatic stress (see also MacNair 2002). Indeed, she argues, “the 
trauma of violence is actually more severe for perpetrators than vic-
tims.” This psychological consequence of engaging in repression could 
potentially lead to defections by security forces, one of the factors that 
Chenoweth (chapter 2) found contributed to successful outcomes for 
an insurgency.
Agents of repression strategize about repression in order to maxi-
mize its demobilization effects and minimize its negative consequences, 
although most of the sociological research has interrogated the move-
ment side of conflicts rather than exploring the role of repressive elites. 
That is the subject of our chapter on “smart” repression (chapter 8), in 
which we present the impulse of authorities to counterstrategize and 
develop tactics and methods intended to anticipate and create dilem-
mas for activists, much as activists attempt to do through their strat-
egizing. Beyer and Earl (chapter 5) discuss how authorities not only try 
to block access to Internet sites but sometimes repress online activities 
offline. Two people were arrested during the G20 public protests in 
Pittsburgh, for example, because of their Twitter use regarding the 
actions, and authorities sentenced two young men for their Facebook 
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posts following August 2011 riots in the United Kingdom, neither of 
whom had participated in the riots themselves (Bowcott, Siddique, 
and Sparrow 2011; Citizen Media Law Project 2010; Moynihan 2009).
In an effort to minimize backfire, authorities sometimes move away 
from overt violence to “less-lethal methods,” intimidation, manipula-
tion, and soft repression. The hegemonic strategies employed by polit-
ical regimes are perhaps not entirely unlike the persuasive strategies 
developed by activists to encourage defections among police and the 
military, often by appeals to a common national or universal iden-
tity. Both sides try to choreograph the dance that adversaries share in 
movement-countermovement interactions.
One extreme case of this move away from violence was the Egyp-
tian military’s role in the Egyptian revolution of 2011, explored in 
chapter 9 by Dalia Ziada. Ziada notes that early on in the uprising, a 
triangle of actors emerged—the police, military, and protesters—and 
the nonviolent response of insurgents to police repression facilitated 
an emerging alliance with the military. Egyptian activists and military 
personnel engaged in mutual interaction, each trying to persuade the 
other. Eschewing their routine tactics of brute repression, the military 
first deployed “negative cooperation” by not shooting at demonstra-
tors, eventually withdrawing their support from the Mubarak regime 
altogether and enabling his downfall, but eventually wresting control 
of the revolution away from organizers of the insurgency.
Ironically, the Egyptian military’s success without violence under-
scores a fundamental principle of nonviolent civil resistance: power can 
be generated in multiple ways. As MacNair underscores, “power is not a 
physical property but a psychological experience” (chapter 4). Another 
powerful social psychological dimension of the repression dynamic is 
fear, the overcoming of which becomes a central aspect of strategic 
preparation, another prominent theme that emerged in these studies.
Preparing for Repression and Overcoming Fear
Preparation is one of the keys for a campaign to manage repression 
successfully and provoke its backfire against elites who try to demo-
bilize a movement. Two of our authors who are also activists, George 
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Lakey (chapter 11) and Jenni Williams (chapter 6), emphasize the fear 
factor and the importance of strategic planning that addresses what 
happens before repressive events, how activists expect to respond 
when repression occurs, and how it is to be framed after the fact to 
highlight its injustice for a broader relevant audience. This work is 
especially important in managing fear.
Advance training of activists allows them to reframe repression 
meaningfully before and after it happens, such as tapping into the res-
onance of cultural themes of sacrifice. They can set in place structures 
like affinity groups that highlight the solidarity of common action. 
Organizers can choreograph actions so that they enhance the positive 
aspects of the repressive experience and make violent repression more 
difficult—like people kneeling to pray as the police attack rather than 
running away.
George Lakey (chapter 11) emphasizes the significance of “ways 
that activists have found to handle fear, make meaning of pain and 
suffering, and support risk-taking so violent repression will not shut 
down their movements.” One such strategy is turning fear into excite-
ment, taking the energy that fear generates and reframing it as an 
opportunity to act side by side with communities of like-minded, 
change-oriented people.
Jenni Williams (chapter 6) describes how Women of Zimbabwe 
Arise (WOZA) proactively replaced a culture of fear with one of resis-
tance in order to move people from isolation to solidarity. She relates 
a story of being arrested at a march for leading a protest and those 
with her insisting that they be arrested with her. The culture of fear 
melted away as the police vehicle became so full of protesters she had 
to squeeze in and take her place among the others police arrested. The 
casting off of fear by WOZA members allowed them to undertake 
increasingly bold actions without inciting repression.
Provocation
When the civil rights campaign to desegregate public facilities waned 
in Birmingham, Alabama, some leaders wanted to organize a demon-
stration with willing young people because the leaders anticipated that 
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repression of such a march would likely backfire. Others, including 
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., at first objected to putting young people 
in harm’s way. When they did eventually proceed with the Children’s 
March, police attacked the teenage demonstrators with firehoses 
and dogs, producing widespread moral outrage (Oppenheimer 1995; 
Wicker 1963; Houston 2004). President Kennedy appeared on national 
television the following day telling the nation that it faced a “moral 
crisis,” calling upon Congress to pass “sweeping legislation to speed 
school desegregation and open public facilities to every American, 
regardless of color” (Wicker 1963). This event was a classic case of the 
paradox of repression, but the question remains: is preparing strate-
gically for repression tantamount to provoking it? The question has 
been a tender subject in the study of nonviolent civil resistance.
While Gandhi may not call for the provocation of opponents, he 
declares that nonviolence often involves taking on suffering rather 
than inflicting it. Whether that necessarily involves strategically pro-
voking repression remains a matter for debate. Some feel that much of 
the power of nonviolent action lies in the purity of a nonviolent disci-
pline that is easily contrasted with the brutality of open repression. In 
chapter 7, we argue that a fundamental goal of nonviolent resistance is 
to proactively heighten the contrast between the nonviolent discipline 
of activists and elite repression.
There may be a fuzzy line between preparing for repression to 
heighten backfire (knowing that it may work to a campaign’s advantage) 
and actually provoking repression. In the 1970s, George Lakey ([1973] 
2012), introduced the concept of dilemma demonstrations, in which 
activists develop actions that put authorities in positions where most 
or all their options might generate advantages for challengers (see also 
Sørensen and Martin 2014). This approach may include ensuring that 
any repression is certain to undermine authorities’ legitimacy. How-
ever, Lakey warns against provoking repression because “provocation 
may alienate the revolutionaries from the people, brutalize the police, 
and even brutalize the demonstrators” ([1973] 2012, 144). Moreover, 
he argues that provocation is tantamount to a manipulation that risks 
disaffecting both the public and the rank and file of the movement. 
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“The organizers should never be in a position of depending on the 
authorities to react violently in order to make their point” (145).
Activists can be pleased when repression does not come, even if it 
could benefit the movement, but that does not bar them from optimiz-
ing backfire as a matter of prudence. Jenni Williams says that mem-
bers of WOZA knowingly put themselves in situations that risked 
repression and that they took responsibility for being part of such a 
confrontational dynamic. Both Lakey and Williams stop short of call-
ing for outright provocation of repression. In fact, in chapter 6, Wil-
liams describes how WOZA choreographs their marches proactively 
to avoid provoking repression. They stop after every city block to sit 
and recite their commitment to nonviolence before moving on.
Mobilization’s Significance
The mobilization of many participants enhances both the paradox of 
repression and chances of a movement’s success (see Chenoweth and 
Stefan 2011). Successful repression management requires mobilizing 
participants, bystanders, and even potential defectors from the forces 
of repression. Erica Chenoweth (chapter 2) found that the level of par-
ticipation was a prime factor in determining the success of a movement 
and also in shaping backfire against repression. We speculate that wider 
participation means greater exposure to repression and thus a greater 
likelihood that those in victims’ networks, and perhaps the broader 
public, would become outraged. Larger actions are also more likely to 
attract the domestic media attention that Chenoweth says is impor-
tant, and are more likely to be diverse and thus include populations, 
such as women and children, that raise the potential cost of repression.
Moreover, when backfire occurs, it mobilizes more people to par-
ticipate and to defect, as Doron Shultziner (chapter 3) notes was the 
case in the killing of a schoolboy in Soweto and the arrest of Rosa 
Parks in Montgomery. Such events radically change the political cli-
mate, transforming people within the movement and the broader soci-
ety, inspiring people to act.
Jenni Williams approaches mobilization from the ground level of 
a movement organizer. In chapter 6, she relates how WOZA mobilized 
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women to speak out, forging “a movement that opened up a new cen-
ter lane in a highly polarized society.” Their main strategy broke ste-
reotypes about women as well as the hold of patriarchy on society, 
empowering women to build a culture of resistance that replaced the 
existing culture of fear and creating a climate in which mobiliza-
tion could occur. Then, in a kind of reversal in the emerging cycle of 
repression and backfire, the women took advantage of their successful 
mobilization, forcing police to beg a large crowd of twenty arrested 
protesters and 180 of their supporters to leave the police station they 
had occupied—in a sense, “unarresting” them and capitulating to the 
growing power of WOZA.
External Factors
Although the civil resistance literature understandably focuses on the 
agency of nonviolent actionists, the role of external actors remains 
significant. The audience for insurgent actions is often not geographi-
cally present; indeed, the key actors in the paradox of repression are 
often in another part of the country or even the globe. Chenoweth’s 
data reveals starkly the importance of regime allies and international 
media coverage of repressive events, which often erodes international 
support for a repressive regime. She finds that, once a regime ally 
withdraws support, the chances for success among the largest cam-
paigns doubles; and when this is combined with “security force loyalty 
shifts and elite defections, . . . the chance of success rockets up to about 
45 percent for the smallest campaigns and 85 percent for the largest” 
(chapter 2).
Doron Shultziner also identifies significant external factors in the 
creation of transformative events. Instances of repression and backfire 
can cascade into large-scale, system-shaking occurrences on the inter-
national stage that are not of the movement’s making, causing transna-
tional ripple effects. Backfire often occurs at other times and in other 
spaces than the repressive events themselves. Tunisia’s rapid revolu-
tion, which was launched with a provocative act of self-immolation 
dramatizing injustice, inspired Egypt’s, as Dalia Ziada notes (chapter 
9), just as the massacre at Tiananmen Square in June 1989 shaped the 
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trajectory of uprisings in Poland and Germany, as we point out in our 
introductory chapter.
In short, agency is enhanced by an understanding of “political 
opportunity structures,” the configuration of factors constraining 
and favoring movement development. The campaigns most likely to 
take advantage of backfire may be those who recognize transforma-
tive moments of repression and how to strike the anvil when the fire 
is hot.
Managing Repression in the Cultural Domain
The paradox of repression is as much about culture as it is about poli-
tics, and it is often the more culturally creative strategies and tactics 
that shape political action rather than the other way around. Doron 
Shultziner’s contribution to our understanding of backfire is, in large 
part, his understanding of repressive events as transformative because 
they resonate with a cultural context, disrupting and shaping it, and 
changing people and institutions in the process. As in anthropolo-
gist Victor Turner’s (1967) concept of liminality, these iconic cultural 
moments turn the social world upside down. Such moments are often 
generated during rituals like the Mardi Gras parade during which 
the princess of spring dethrones old man winter. In the paradox of 
repression, the regime, whose legitimacy is usually taken for granted, 
suddenly becomes a monster slaying innocents and against which 
right-thinking bystanding publics should rebel.
Brian Martin, in his foreword to this volume, suggests that activ-
ists counter each one of the methods authorities use to reduce outrage 
in order to reshape the frame that the public uses to interpret repres-
sive events: “exposing the action, validating the target, interpreting 
the events as an injustice, mobilizing support (and avoiding official 
channels), and resisting intimidation and rewards.”
In chapter 10, Chaiwat Satha-Anand describes a “nonviolent explo-
sion” of creative nonviolent actions across Thailand as a response to 
repressive violence. Nonviolent resistance became possible because of 
“how the political space left from repression interacted with alterna-
tive leadership from within the movement and a history of nonviolent 
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resistance in Thai society.” Culturally savvy leaders took advantage 
of a violent turn in the otherwise nonviolent Red Shirts movement, 
and the ensuing brutal repression caused the Red Shirts movement to 
collapse in May 2010. Protest leader Sombat Boonngamanong cried 
for days after the violent repression and channeled that energy into 
Facebook posts. Then, a new nonviolent resistance called Red Sun-
day challenged the emergency law prohibiting political gatherings; 
protesters tied red ribbons at the site of the demonstration that had 
been brutally repressed by the military. Rather than high-risk public 
demonstrations, the Red Sunday group held aerobic dances and used 
humor and cultural symbols to help people overcome the fear that 
the regime had promoted. Much of the struggle in Thailand was thus 
waged in the cultural and psychological arena.
Similarly, George Lakey (chapter 11) emphasizes the importance 
of the stories a movement’s activists tell to themselves to make mean-
ing out of the suffering they receive at the hands of those in power, 
often by refashioning ancient themes of suffering, martyrdom, and 
spiritual transformation in their cultural traditions.
Establishing meaning also figures prominently in our analysis of 
how a movement choreographs its acts of resistance, and the cultural 
contexts in which activists operate are always important, as we discuss 
in chapter 7. Insurgents thus generate frame resonance between move-
ment goals and widely held cultural values to mobilize both poten-
tial participants in a movement and possible defectors from the power 
structure. Thus, Williams (in chapter 6) reflects on how WOZA par-
ticipants transformed the authority of a traditional cultural role—that 
of the mother—into a vehicle for protest as they courageously scolded 
Robert Mugabe and the political elites for their unacceptable behavior 
as exploitative leaders of the country. In chapter 7, we apply the fun-
damental importance of framing and meaning-making to repression 
management and argue that the way activists “set the table” (cultur-
ally, through their tactical decisions) establishes crucial precedents for 
the interpretation of repression in their favor. The symbols resistors 
use and the narratives on which they draw prestructure the range of 
possible interpretations of moments of repression and enhance the 
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perceptual contrast between the bullying tactics of opponents and the 
nonviolent discipline of activists.
Expanding Frameworks for Understanding Repression
Despite decades of theorizing and research into nonviolent civil resis-
tance, the study of what has been called political jiu-jitsu (Sharp 1973), 
moral jiu-jitsu (Gregg 1938), backlash (Francisco 1995, 1996), or back-
fire (Martin 2007, 2012) remains relatively underdeveloped. As Beyer 
and Earl point out in chapter 5, there is a tendency to lump all forms 
of repression into one category, perhaps because methodologically it 
is easier to study spectacular and overt forms of physical repression 
that attract media coverage and generate moral outrage. However, as 
research progresses, we are bound to refine our study of nonviolent 
resistance, nonviolent organizations and movements, and the regimes 
and corporations that they challenge. This volume begins to outline 
the diverse types of movement and regime goals and actions that inev-
itably interact to generate various movement outcomes, including the 
paradox of repression.
Beyer and Earl take us into the burgeoning world of online activ-
ism that has a different set of ground rules (physics even) that govern 
the strategic interaction of opponents. They systematically enumerate 
different types of online resistance, such as denial of service attacks 
(often leading to arrests), networking, and information sharing. Like-
wise, they present alternative forms of repression most likely to be 
deployed against online activist strategies.
Observing a continuum of repression strategies that authorities 
employ to demobilize nonviolent movements, as we do in the introduc-
tion, enhances our conceptualization of repression by offering a higher 
resolution view of the concept (Figure 12.1), and Erica Chenoweth 
calls us to think more carefully about how the intentions of repressive 
actors may be difficult to discern as scholars try to reconstruct retro-
spective accounts of repression. Moreover, Dalia Ziada alerts us to the 
potential for multiple targets of repression. Simple dyadic models of 
regimes and dissenters may exclude repression against defectors and 
various resistance flanks.
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Social Psychological Dimensions
Rachel MacNair’s observation that power “is a psychological expe-
rience” (chapter 4) strikes us as a patently true but underestimated 
aspect of nonviolent strategic action. Like MacNair, Doron Shultziner 
focuses on transformative repressive events as psychological phenom-
ena; chapter 3 hinges heavily on the mass perception that “‘politics as 
usual’ is suspended” and “the creation of new spaces and mass meet-
ings inject new meaning, perspective, and points of reference to citi-
zens’ lives.”
Fear emerges as one of the most fundamental psychological dy-
namics at play in nonviolent civil resistance. Gandhi wrote extensively 
about the importance of overcoming fear, arguing, “we cannot have too 
much bravery, too much self-sacrifice . . . I want . . . the greater bravery 
of the meek, the gentle and the nonviolent, the bravery that will mount 
the gallows without injuring, or harbouring any thought of injury to 
a single soul” (1967, see chapter 12 in “The Gospel of Fearlessness”). 
Gene Sharp (1973) has established overcoming fear as a fundamental 
principle of effective nonviolent resistance, noting that people obey au-
thorities for a variety of reasons ranging from habit to fear, all of which 
can be helpfully studied through psychological lenses. Sharp points out 
that repression is not actually the generator of obedience, but the fear 
that repression creates. No regime can repress all of its people. It is the 
threat of repression that people fear, dissuading them from challenging 
injustices. Thus, overcoming fear is largely about altering perceptions. 
George Lakey explains how storytelling becomes a collective and ther-
apeutic way of shifting perceptions of fear and managing repression. 
Similarly, Jenni Williams also relays the slow but intentional empower-
ment of women in Zimbabwe as a form of fear management.
In trying to expand frameworks for understanding repression, we 
must also strive to understand conflict from the perspective of agents 
of repression, as MacNair does in her chapter on how perpetration 
induced traumatic stress syndrome likely impacts many agents of 
repression and the likelihood that they may modify their repression, 
disobey orders, or even defect.
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Framing and the Media
Because of the reciprocal nature of conflict, insurgent challenges and 
elite responses evolve into framing contests, with each party trying to 
mobilize support and resonate with significant themes within shared 
culture. These framing contests are profoundly shaped by the media, 
especially beyond a local level, where people do not experience them 
firsthand. How the media portrays their respective frames shapes the 
public’s discourse about the issues at stake, a fact of which the various 
parties involved are usually quite aware. The media effect is embel-
lished by the fact that repressive events are often the most newsworthy.
Chenoweth’s (chapter 2) study of 323 campaigns for dramatic 
change, such as bringing down dictators or driving out occupations, 
concludes that the most significant processes leading to campaign suc-
cess historically are “campaign size, loyalty shifts among regime func-
tionaries, and the removal of support for the regime by an erstwhile 
ally.” “For repression to backfire in any meaningful sense,” she argues, 
“participation is crucial.” One vital factor in mobilizing participation, 
especially on a broader geographical scale, is international media cov-
erage, which raises awareness and pressures regime allies to withdraw 
support of the target regime.
Media coverage is not enough, however (surprisingly, domestic 
media coverage had no significant effect in Chenoweth’s study); and 
we know from the extensive social movement literature that framing 
issues is one of the core tasks of social movements. We argue in chap-
ter 7 that the framing contest between elites and movements must 
result in a shift in control of political discourse from elites to move-
ment coalitions and that repressive events are critical sites of fram-
ing contention. Repression management to enhance backfire requires 
that insurgents’ frames resonate with existing cultural norms and 
dispositions and that the careful choreography of strategic nonviolent 
action in the face of repression can go a long way toward ensuring 
that repression is more likely to backfire by boldly dramatizing the 
dissonance between authorities’ repression and the nonviolence of dis-
ciplined activists.
314 | Lee A .  Smithey a n d Lester R .  K u rtz
Future Research
A number of the issues emerging in this volume have been inadequately 
studied or conceptualized and could be fruitfully explored. First, 
it would be helpful to have more focused case studies of nonviolent 
resistance under repression, on the one hand, and more big-picture 
explorations, either with quantitative data sets or conceptualizations, 
on the other. Case studies like those in this volume on Zimbabwe, the 
US civil rights movement, and the South African antiapartheid strug-
gle, as well as movements for change in Thailand, Egypt, and online, 
provide in-depth insights into the actual processes set into motion by 
repressive events and movement responses to them. We need more on-
the-ground case studies that focus specifically on repression to develop 
a better comparative historical basis for understanding which aspects 
of backfire are more general and which are more situation-specific.
Chenoweth’s NAVCO data set1 reveals a rich set of broad patterns 
regarding repression of particular types of campaigns (overthrowing 
dictators, removing occupying troops, and secessionist movements). 
Her new data set, NAVCO 2.0 (see Chenoweth and Lewis 2013) in-
cludes more cases and data that should give us further insights. It would 
be helpful to explore other large data sets in terms of repression issues 
and one such possibility is the Global Nonviolent Action Database,2 which 
offers a growing selection of cases featuring the paradox of repression.
Conceptual issues in need of development and empirical inves-
tigation include the question of how the use of violence (regardless 
of by whom) actually undermines the legitimacy of the perpetrator 
among insider elites and within the broader population. Do non-state 
terror organizations suffer a loss of legitimacy when they use violent 
methods? If so, are they as great as those incurred by states and other 
authority structures?
1. This data set can be found at the NAVCO Data Project website (https://www
.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow_navco_data.html).
2. This database (nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu), housed at Swarthmore College,
includes a selection of cases featuring the paradox of repression (bit.ly/pdoxrepgnad).
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At the same time, we need research into the power elite side of 
framing contests. Most sociological studies of repression explore the 
social movement side of conflicts, paying less attention to the elite 
side, in part because of a lack of access to the latter. In our exploration 
of smart repression, we found some interesting research along those 
lines, and there is no doubt much more to be discovered.
MacNair’s chapter on perpetration-induced traumatic stress 
suggests another crucial area, the psychological aspects of repres-
sion from the point of view of those actors attempting to demobilize 
a movement. Psychological costs may be associated with the use of 
violence that could be counted as part of the paradoxical nature of 
repression. Research into perpetration-induced posttraumatic stress 
disorder (Grossman and Siddle 2008; MacNair 2002) suggests that the 
relational nature of conflict can cause psychological distress among 
those who use violence. Future research should explore to what extent 
the use of violence carries psychological costs and whether and how 
those costs can be leveraged by others.
Both additional case studies and quantitative overviews might pro-
vide insights into the most successful tactics of repression management 
used by various movements for different kinds of change in particular 
sociocultural contexts. Indeed, one important issue often debated but 
inadequately researched is the relative impact of tactics on the one 
hand, and context, on the other, or what is sometimes called agency 
and structure. The nonviolence literature often emphasizes agency, 
while sociologists and many political scientists often see the structural 
constraints on action as more significant.
What are the key historical factors that have resulted in success-
ful or failed attempts by movements to enhance the backfire effect of 
repressive events? It would also be helpful, as Beyer and Earl suggest 
in chapter 5, to learn more about the varying effects of repression on 
different levels, such as individuals, networks, SMOs, movements, and 
the public as bystanders.
Finally, a more in-depth understanding of the media’s role in 
repression and its backfire would be an essential component of our 
effort to understand how the paradox of repression unfolds. Both the 
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mainstream and alternative media, along with social media generally, 
are key sites for framing contests between elites and insurgents, and we 
get some insight into that from the chapter by Beyer and Earl. We look 
forward to other scholars and activists understanding and sharing how 
repression backfires and movements for change become empowered.
The paradox of repression is a major aspect of the power rela-
tionships between authorities and insurgents that has not been fully 
researched. In this volume, we have endeavored to present the theo-
retical foundations of the phenomenon and to investigate the way in 
which activists exercise agency by preparing for and managing repres-
sion. Careful nonviolent strategy can influence the course of a conflict 
by raising the costs of repression, although nonviolent activists and 
elites both think about and prepare for repression, choreographing 
their actions in relation to their opponents’ actions.
We have joined our contributing authors to expand the frameworks 
for further scholarship on this topic by conceptualizing repression and 
the ever-changing terrain on which movements and authorities con-
tend, technologically, politically, and culturally. Our contributors have 
confirmed that repression often backfires and has profound cultural 
and psychological underpinnings, including the fundamental genera-
tion of fear (which nonviolent activists work to overcome), the psycho-
logical costs of repression for perpetrators, moments of transformative 
awakening, and the many resources that movements and elites may 
draw on for hegemonic or liberatory purposes. We hope that this 
deeply collaborative process will help to generate ever more rigorous 
scholarship on the topics of repression and backfire, thus broadening 
and deepening the use of strategic nonviolent action as an alternative 
to more violent forms of conflict.
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